Hedge fund activism has emerged as a major force of corporate governance since the 2000s. By the mid-2000s, there were between 150-200 activist hedge funds in action each year, advocating for changes in 200-300 publicly listed companies in the U.S. In this paper, we review the evolution and major characteristics of hedge fund activism, as well as the short-and long-term impact of such activities on the performance and governance of the targeted companies. Though most of the analyses are based on a comprehensive sample of over 2,000 activism events in the U.S. from 1994 to 2011, hand-collected by the authors from regulatory filings and news searches, this paper covers all major studies on the topic, including those on non-U.S. markets. 
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I. Data on Hedge Fund Activism
This section reviews the approaches researchers have taken to construct samples of hedge fund activism events. Data on activist interventions in the U.S. are generally based on Schedule 13D filings submitted to the SEC. Section 13(d) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act requires investors who are beneficial owners of over 5% of any class of publicly traded securities of a company, and who have an intention to influence corporate control, to disclose their ownership and intent within 10 days of crossing the 5% threshold. The Schedule 13D filing provides the filing date and information about the identity of the filer, such as the filer's ownership and its changes, cost of purchase, and most importantly, the purpose of the investment (from Item 4 "Purpose of Transaction").
It is important to note that the SEC allows beneficial owners who have purchased shares in the ordinary course of business and do not intend to influence control to file a Schedule 13G, which requires less information and allows the filer a longer delay in disclosure. events, which is consistent with the rising success of hedge fund activism and the increase in capital committed to these funds. Second, both plots show a pro-cyclical pattern. Activism events peak in good times, whereas there is increased exit and a decline in engagements in recessions (Burkart & Dasgupta (2014) ). Brav et al. (2008) summarize the stated objectives that the activist funds provide when they announce their intent to intervene into the following five major categories:
II. Characteristics of Hedge Fund Activism Events
"general undervaluation/maximize shareholder value," "capital structure," "business strategy," "sale of target company," and "governance." The objectives, except the first, are not mutually exclusive as one activist event can target multiple issues. The first category represents 59.5% of the sample and includes events in which the hedge fund believes that the company is undervalued and/or that the fund can help the manager maximize shareholder value. The second category (12.7% of the sample) includes activism targeting firms' payout policies and capital structure. The third set of events includes activism targeting issues related to business strategy, such as operational efficiency, business restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, and growth strategies. This group represents 17.8% of all events. The fourth category, comprising 15.2% of activist events, involves activism demanding the sale of the target. In this category, hedge funds attempt either to force a sale of the target company to a third party, or, in a small minority of the cases, to acquire the company themselves. Lastly, the fifth set of events includes activism targeting corporate governance. In this category, representing 31% of the sample, hedge funds attempt to rescind takeover defenses, oust the CEO or chairman, challenge board independence and fair representation, demand more information disclosure and question potential fraud, or challenge the level or the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. Greenwood & Schor (2009) report a similar representation of objectives for their sample of hedge fund activism: They find that agendas related to undervaluation, capital structure, asset sales, and corporate governance represent 45.5, 11.5, 18.1, and 21.9 percent of their full sample, respectively. percent average. It therefore appears that the activist hedge funds do not generally aim to take control of their targets. Rather, their goal is to push the target to undertake valueenhancing decisions as minority shareholders. As such, they often need support from other shareholders, especially on issues that require shareholder voting. These features distinguish the activist hedge funds from the corporate raiders in the 1980s, who sought to obtain full control to internalize all the benefits from their intervention.
Finally, activist hedge funds' investment horizons have been an issue of contention. Critics accuse activist funds of aiming for short-term gains at the expense of long-term shareholder value. 3 We measure the duration of hedge fund activists' investment in target companies from the day the market first learns of the activist stake through the "exit date" when the hedge fund significantly reduces its investment in the target company. We use the last 13D/A filing to determine when the ownership drops below the 5% disclosure threshold (i.e., the "exit date"). When such information is not available, we use the date when the outcome of sale of the target or the fund's withdrawal from the intervention is announced. Focusing on the sub-sample of the completed events where the information to determine the exit date is available, we find that the median (mean) duration from the first Schedule 13D filing to divestment is 348 (581) days, implying that the distribution of the duration is right-skewed. Furthermore, as also shown by Boyson & Mooradian (2010) , events that are initiated with hostility have a shorter investment horizon than the non-hostile events.
However, the estimates reported above generally under-estimate the unconditional duration of hedge funds' investment in the target companies because they exclude investments censored at the end of the sample period and they assume that dropping below 5% level represents divestment. Using the annual portfolio turnover rates of the activist hedge funds (based on their quarterly holdings disclosed in 13F filings), Brav et al. (2008) report that the average holding period of a position is close to two years.
III. Characteristics of Target Companies
We now discuss evidence based on regression results predicting hedge funds' because of the large amount of capital a hedge fund would need to invest in order to amass a meaningful stake, which might in turn introduce an inordinate amount of idiosyncratic risk to the portfolio.
We also find that activist hedge funds behave like "value investors" attempting to identify undervalued companies where the potential for improvement is high. q, a proxy for firm valuation defined as (book value of debt + market value of equity)/(book value of debt + book value of equity), is inversely related to the likelihood of intervention. To the extent that activist hedge funds profit from improvement of the companies' operations and strategies, it is also important that hedge funds target companies whose stock prices have yet to reflect the potential for improvement. Target firms outside the U.S. have a similar characteristic of "value firms."
We also find that target firms tend to be less profitable than comparable firms, as measured by return on assets (ROA). Consistent with the evidence on profitability, lagged annual sales growth is also inversely related to targeting, although this result is not statistically robust. Target firms also have higher leverage, significantly lower dividend payouts, and less research and development spending than do peer firms. While the finding on R&D is statistically weak in our sample, this result is confirmed by Boyson & Mooradian (2010) , who report that target firms have lower R&D expenditures than matched firms at the median.
Finally, as in Brav et al. (2010), we find that targets have significantly higher institutional ownership than their peers but that analyst coverage is inversely related to intervention in a multivariate regression framework. Given that analyst coverage is positively related to the propensity of activism in a univariate regression, it is likely that the collinearity with institutional ownership and the illiquidity measure leads the sign on analyst coverage to flip (as both institutional ownership and analyst coverage proxy for shareholder sophistication). This is an important factor for activist hedge funds because they often rely on the understanding and support from fellow shareholders in order to implement the changes, given their minority stakes in the target firms. Using a direct trading liquidity measure, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, we find that target companies exhibit higher trading liquidity than comparable firms. High liquidity makes it easier for the activists to accumulate a stake within a short period of time without incurring adverse market impact (Collin-Dufresne & Fos (2014)).
In summary, the characteristics of target firms suggest that hedge funds tend to identify problems that are generalizable to all firms, such as changes in governance and payout policies, rather than issues that are specific to individual target firms. These targeting patterns seem sensible given that hedge funds are, in general, not experts in the specific business of the firms they invest in. Focusing on issues that are generalizable to other potential target firms helps to lower the marginal cost of launching activism on a new company (Black (1990) ). Another reason to avoid targeting an idiosyncratic firm issue is offered by Kahn & Winton (1998) . Their theory predicts that investors are more likely to intervene in well-understood firms or industries so that the market can appreciate the effects of intervention.
IV. Does Hedge Fund Activism Create Value for Shareholders?
We now ask whether hedge fund activism generates value for shareholders. We address this question by examining both short-run stock returns around the announcement of activism as well as subsequent long-run returns. The spike in abnormal trading volume does not occur on the event day but rather during the ten-day period before the announcement. The ten day lead seems to be consistent with the fact that investors are required to file Schedule 13D no later than ten days after the transaction causing them to exceed the 5% threshold. Therefore, it is possible that the filing fund may be engaging in additional buying prior to the announcement of activism.
Alternatively, the abnormal volume in the days preceding the filing date may be consistent with "wolf pack" investing, in which several hedge funds, who do not formally coordinate, buy into the target firm or with "tipping," where the lead hedge fund reveals its intention to a small number of investors before the public filing.
Further evidence on the time-series properties of the short-run average abnormal return is given in Figure 3 
V. The Real and Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism
Though there has been little controversy over the positive short-term stock market reaction, there has been significant recent debate over whether the effects of shareholder activism are "real" -that is, whether activists have a long-term effect on firm "fundamentals" that lasts beyond the short-term market reaction or whether activist interventions are mere "financial engineering." Most critics of hedge fund activism have argued that activists narrowly focus on short-term financial performance, and that such "short-termism," as well as a focus on financial metrics, is detrimental to the long-term value of the target companies. This concern over short-termism has been repeated by abnormal returns following activist interventions, to argue that the purported gains from activism reflect wealth transfers rather than overall net gains.
In this section, we present comprehensive empirical evidence to directly address the concerns regarding the "real" and "long-term" effects of hedge fund activism.
A. The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism
The most "real" part of the economy is probably the production process. About 
A1. Productivity before and after activism
When Brav et al. (2013) examine the productivity of assets in place they find that productivity declines in the years prior to intervention, but then rebounds steadily afterwards. Plant productivity, measured as total factor productivity ("TFP"), is defined as the difference between the actual and predicted output given the inputs, and is calculated as the residual from a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function run at the 
A2. Productivity associated with capital reallocation
Given the evidence that productivity increases following the intervention, an equally important question is whether such improvements are accomplished through improvements in the efficiency of assets in place, capital reallocation, or both. Brav et al.
(2008) and Greenwood & Schor (2009) show that initial stock returns are greatest for those activism events in which the stated goal is to push for the sale of the target.
However, these early studies left three unanswered questions. First, data at the firm level provides limited inference on the separation between assets in place and redeployment.
Second, operating performance based on accounting data, such as ROA, cannot capture real changes at the production-unit level. Third, about 25.5% of the firms targeted by hedge funds activists drop out of Compustat within two years (this is almost double the average attrition rate for firms in Compustat). Hence, firm-level analysis may suffer from an attrition bias. The plant level analysis that can be conducted using the Census data has provided significant progress on these issues.
Plant-level asset redeployment reveals key aspects of activists' impact that are hard to qualify and quantify at the firm level. Brav et al. (2013) show that underperforming plants are more likely to be sold following hedge fund intervention compared with plants of similar attributes. While roughly 23% of the plants of targeted companies were sold during the three years following intervention, the same sale rate for plants at non-targeted companies was 13%. Notably, the high rate of plant sales is even more pronounced when the plant belongs to an industry with low concentration, suggesting the role of asset redeployability (Williamson (1988) ) and the number of potential buyers in facilitating physical capital reallocation.
The divestiture of negative NPV assets, on its own, could enhance value for the shareholders, but it is not clear whether it increases overall efficiency across the economy.
If the poorly performing plant experiences an increase in productivity under new ownership, this strengthens the argument that asset redeployment associated with hedge fund activism creates value. Further analysis shows that plants sold after intervention exhibit the familiar V-shaped pattern in which productivity decreases during the two years before the sale, but then increases after the sale. Moreover, the increase in productivity for plant sales following hedge fund intervention is roughly six times greater than the increase in productivity for plant sales that were not associated with hedge fund intervention.
A3. The effects of hedge fund activism on other stakeholders
Some of those who oppose hedge fund activism express the concern that the shareholder gain could be a result of wealth transfer from other stakeholders rather than value creation. The literature so far has analyzed the effects on the other two most important groups of stakeholders: creditors and employees.
(i) Creditors
The effect of hedge fund intervention on creditors based on the existent studies is mixed with a close-to-neutral average impact. Moreover, the outcome appears to be to management, and tends to be associated with better outcomes for junior creditors, in the form of higher probability of emergence and better recovery.
(
ii) Employees
As expected, activists are not kind to senior managers such as CEOs. Brav et al.
( 2008) and Fos (2014) show that CEO turnover doubles and compensation is moderated and more sensitive to performance after activist intervention. While most observers tend to view these changes as signs of better governance, a related concern might arise as to whether hedge fund activism might also negatively impact employees below the executive rank.
Brav et al. (2013) analyze the changes in wages and work hours for factory
workers and staff using the plant-level data. They show that the number of workers and the hours per worker decrease following intervention, but that output per hour (a measure of labor productivity) increases. The change in wages is not itself statistically significant, but the magnitude of the decrease in the number of total labor hours is economically meaningful: there is a 10% decrease in total labor hours from the year of intervention to three years later. The intervention reduces a wage level that is significantly above peers to a level that is at par with the industry peers. The increase in productivity per hour is also meaningful as there is a 7.3% increase in labor productivity in the three years following intervention. This result is consistent with the argument made by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Pagano & Volpin (2005) that tightened monitoring on the target's management is associated with improved labor efficiency and more scrutiny over generous wages. Moreover, the increase in the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance could give mangers stronger incentives to monitor employees and improve their efficiency. Relatedly, Popadak (2014) shows that hedge fund activism reduces the "culture" orientation of the firm, where culture includes customer-focus, employee integrity, and collaboration.
A4. Externalities
More recently, several papers examine how the "threat" of activism has a spillover effect that disciplines managers at non-target companies. Fos (2014) studies proxy contests and demonstrates that the mere threat, as measured by the probability of being targeted, accomplishes similar outcomes to actual proxy contests because firms under the "threat" take pre-emptive actions such as increased payouts and leverage, reduction in investment, and heightened CEO turnover and scrutiny over CEO pay. In sum, the threat of activism produces positive externalities at non-target firms.
This is consistent with anecdotal evidence from practitioners that managers attempt to self-correct when they are concerned that they will become a target.
A5. Inferences about causality
Although the combined results from the literature are consistent with activists improving performance, these results do not prove a causal relationship. In fact, the observed statistical relations are most plausibly a combination of the effects of stock picking and effort exertion by the activists. Hedge funds are sophisticated investors who could potentially profit from picking companies with improving prospects even if they remain passive stakeholders, and at the same time hedge funds are likely to choose those battles in which they can more effectively influence the outcome in their favor.
For this reason, a standard average treatment effect, i.e., the improvement a hedge activist could bring about if it were randomly assigned to a company, is likely to be limited; moreover, the identification of such an effect is also of limited value for policy Overall, the results do not provide any evidence of long-term underperformance, and there is no evidence to suggest that the initial spike in stock price reverses.
A. The most likely "short-termist" schemes
Bebchuk et al. (2014) examine the three most likely "short-termist" schemes in isolation so as to better detect any evidence of post-intervention underperformance. The schemes are the following: the "pump and dump" scheme, the "asset stripping" criticism, and "adversarial" interventions.
According to the "pump and dump" argument, hedge funds enjoy sizable abnormal returns while holding the stock, but then sell the stock after subjecting the company through various acts of financial engineering such as leveraged recapitalizations.
This scheme allows the activist to benefit at the expense of other shareholders, who are left with tarnished assets and negative abnormal returns. To test whether firm returns do in fact decrease after the activist sells her shares, the authors focus on the stock returns in the three years following the filing of an amendment to the original Schedule 13D
indicating that the activist's holdings have fallen below the five percent threshold. They calculate abnormal returns using individual firm regressions, a comparison of buy and hold returns, and long-term portfolio analysis. In all instances, they find no evidence suggesting that the target companies underperform following the activists' departure-abnormal returns are either significantly positive or, at worst, not significantly different from zero.
Critics of hedge fund activism frequently note that some activists reduce firm resources by stripping the firm of assets via cash payouts and asset sales, and they point to this tactic as particularly detrimental because they claim the target firm is saddled with 
